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So far Sarina Gandy has created 135 blog entries.

GNSI Tampa Summit | The Russia-Ukraine War: Lessons for Future Conflicts

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a sharp evolution, if not a revolution, in modern conflict and wartime strategy. Emerging technologies and innovative strategies such as drone employment, information operations, social media, and battlefield medical treatment have featured prominently and will impact how combatants around the world approach future conflict. How can we expect these lessons to be applied, and how should U.S. national policy address these changes?

In cooperation with the USF College of Arts and Sciences, the Institute for Russians, European, and Eurasian Studies and the United States Central Command, GNSI Tampa Summit 5 will bring together the country’s boldest scholars, subject matter experts, and policymakers to probe deeply into those questions and many more.

General (Ret) Frank Mckenzie

Executive Director, GNSI, University of South Florida and former commander of U.S. Central Command

John Kirby

White House National Security Communications Advisor

Olga Chiriac, PhD

Project Europe Director, Irregular Warfare Initiative

Ambassador (Ret) Bill Taylor

Vice President, Europe and Russia, USIP and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine

David Kramer

Executive Director, George W. Bush Institute

Peter Pomerantsev

Senior Fellow, SNF Agora Institute, Johns Hopkins University

These are just a few of the all-star lineup of speakers. Additional discussions:

• Ukraine Strategic Lessons

• Drones in Modern War: Land, Sea and Air

• The Impact on Europe and NATO

Deep Dive Breakout Sessions are Back!

• Medical Treatment in War

• Russian/Iranian/North Korean Cooperation

• Civilians in War

GNSI Tampa Summit | The Russia-Ukraine War: Lessons for Future Conflicts2025-03-06T14:40:03-05:00

The Journey of a CISO Whisperer: Michael Piacente on a New Approach to Diversity in Cyber

The Journey of a CISO Whisperer: Michael Piacente on a New Approach to Diversity in Cyber2025-01-08T10:27:12-05:00

Cyber Traps and Mentorship: Maretta Morovitz on Engaging Adversaries

Cyber Traps and Mentorship: Maretta Morovitz on Engaging Adversaries2024-12-17T11:03:04-05:00

chat:CYBR Podcast Bonus Episode: Ernie Ferraresso

In this episode of chat:CYBR, hosts James Jacobs and Jordan Deiuliis welcome Ernie Ferraresso, the Director of Cyber Florida, to discuss the organization’s achievements over the past year and plans for the future. They delve into the impact of Cyber Florida’s programs, including the Sunshine Cyber Conference and Cyber Launch events, and highlight the importance of the cybersecurity education and workforce development initiatives that Cyber Florida is engaged in.

chat:CYBR Podcast Bonus Episode: Ernie Ferraresso2025-02-18T12:19:03-05:00

chat:CYBR Podcast Episode 7: Frank Cilluffo

In this episode of chat:CYBR, host James Jacobs and co-host Jordan Deiuliis engage with Frank Cilluffo, director of Auburn University’s McCrary Institute for Cyber and Critical Infrastructure Security. They discuss the Cyberspace Solarium Commission’s role in shaping U.S. cybersecurity policy, the recent report ‘Securing America’s Digital Future,’ and the importance of viewing cybersecurity as integral to economic competitiveness.

chat:CYBR Podcast Episode 7: Frank Cilluffo2025-02-18T12:19:18-05:00

Growth, Gratitude, and Goals: A Do We Belong Here Holiday Special

Growth, Gratitude, and Goals: A Do We Belong Here Holiday Special2024-12-17T11:02:25-05:00

LandUpdate808

I. Targeted Entities

  • Internet users

II. Introduction

LandUpdate808 is a malicious downloader that distributes malicious payloads disguised as fake browser updates. The downloader is usually hosted on malicious or compromised websites. LandUpdate808 was identified by the Center for Internet Security as a top ten observed malware in quarter three of 2024, landing as the second most prominent identified malware.

III. Additional Background Information

LandUpdate808 redirects website visitors to first download the loader for the fake update content. The redirect also adds a cookie to the targeted user which has been observed with the naming conventions “isDone” or “isVisited11”. The cookie’s value is set to true after the operation is successful. The cookie has an expiration date of four days and will cause the malware to skip over the previous steps if the cookie is detected. The fake update page is disguised as an out-of-date Chrome notification with a blue download button labeled “Update Chrome”. When clicked, the button will link to an “update.php” file. The payload has been observed as a JS, EXE, and MSIX file that changes file type frequently. Recent reporting has identified multiple domains being tied to the same IP address, a potential indicator that the LandUpdate808 operation is expanding operations.

IV. MITRE ATT&CK

  • T1592 – Gather Victim Host Information
    • Using the function getOS located in the request for the page loader, LandUpdate808 gathers basic host information such as IP address and operating system.
  • T1584 – Compromise Infrastructure
    • LandUpdate808 uses compromised domains as part of the malware’s delivery chain.
  • T1608 – Stage Capabilities
    • LandUpdate808 stages web resources that act as link targets in the delivery chain.
  • T1204 – User Execution
    • LandUpdate808 relies on the user to click on the fake Chrome update to download and execute the desired payload onto the system.

V. Recommendations

We recommend monitoring your network for the following indicators of compromise to identify if users have been potentially compromised by LandUpdate808 and the related payloads.

VI. IOCs (Indicators of Compromise)

Type Indicator
Domains – Malicious Payloads

netzwerkreklame[.]de

Domains – Malicious Payloads

digimind[.]nl

Domains – Malicious Payloads

monlamdesigns[.]com

Domains – Malicious Payloads sustaincharlotte[.]org
Domains – Malicious Payloads chicklitplus[.]com
Domains – Malicious Payloads espumadesign[.]com
Domains – Malicious Payloads owloween[.]com
Domains – Malicious Payloads Wildwoodpress[.]org
Domains – Malicious Payloads napcis[.]org
Domains – Malicious Payloads sunkissedindecember[.]com
Domains – Malicious Payloads rm-arquisign[.]com
Domains – Fake Update Page Code kongtuke[.]com
Domains – Fake Update Page Code uhsee[.]com
Domains – Fake Update Page Code  zoomzle[.]com
Domains – Fake Update Page Code elamoto[.]com
Domains – Fake Update Page Code ashleypuerner[.]com
Domains – Fake Update Page Code edveha[.]com
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content razzball[.]com
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content monitor[.]icef[.]com
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content careers-advice-online[.]com
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content ecowas[.]int
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content sixpoint[.]com
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content eco-bio-systems[.]de
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content evolverangesolutions[.]com
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content natlife[.]de
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content sunkissedindecember[.]com
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content fajardo[.]inter[.]edu
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content fup[.]edu[.]co
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content lauren-nelson[.]com
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content netzwerkreklame[.]de
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content digimind[.]nl
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content itslife[.]in
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content ecohortum[.]com
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content thecreativemom[.]com
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content backalleybikerepair[.]com
Domains – Initiated Requests for Content mocanyc[.]org

VII. References

Samala, A. (2024b, October 15). New Behavior for LandUpdate808 Observed. Malasada Tech. https://malasada.tech/new-behavior-for-landupdate808-observed/

Samala, A. (2024a, July 2). The LandUpdate808 Fake Update Variant. Malasada Tech. https://malasada.tech/the-landupdate808-fake-update-variant/

Threat Advisory created by The Cyber Florida Security Operations Center. Contributing Security Analysts: Benjamin Price

LandUpdate8082024-12-03T13:25:35-05:00

SocGholish Holds Top Spot as Leading Malware in Q3 2024

I. Targeted Entities

  • Fortune 500 Companies
  • Government Agencies

II. Introduction

According to The Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center’s (MS-ISAC) monitoring services, SocGholish has retained its position as the most prevalent malware in Q3 2024, accounting for 42% of observed infections. SocGholish is a JavaScript-based downloader that spreads primarily through malicious or compromised websites that present fake browser update prompts to users. Once deployed, SocGholish infections can facilitate further exploitation by delivering additional malicious payloads.

III. Additional Background Information

SocGholish, also known as “FakeUpdates,” has emerged as the leading malware in Q3 2024. This malware has been active since 2018 and operates as a JavaScript-based downloader that exploits drive-by-download techniques to gain initial access. SocGholish primarily spreads through compromised websites, which present fake browser or software update prompts to unsuspecting users. When users download and run the updates, they execute a malicious payload that establishes communication with SocGholish’s command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.

The malware typically delivers its payload via direct download of JavaScript files or, less frequently, within obfuscated ZIP archives to evade detection. The attackers have continued to adapt, using techniques such as homoglyphs in filenames to bypass string-based detection methods. Once deployed, SocGholish conducts reconnaissance on infected systems, identifying users, endpoints, and potentially critical assets such as Active Directory domains. In about 10% of cases, the malware escalates to delivering second-stage payloads, including remote access tools (RATs) like Mythic, replacing previously popular choices like NetSupport.

SocGholish serves as an initial access broker, facilitating further exploitation by delivering additional malware, including ransomware variants such as LockBit and WastedLocker. Its activities are often precursors to larger attacks, making it a critical threat to monitor. Infections may involve domain trust enumeration and script-based data exfiltration, primarily executed in memory, complicating detection efforts. Organizations are advised to implement preventive measures, such as disabling automatic JavaScript execution, monitoring for unusual script activity, and swiftly isolating infected hosts to mitigate the impact of potential intrusions.

IV. MITRE ATT&CK

  • T1059.007 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
    SocGholish payload is executed as JavaScript, aiding in bypassing executable-based detections.
  • T1074.001 – Data Staged: Local Data Staging
    Sends output from whoami to a local temp file (e.g., rad<5-hex-chars>.tmp) for staging prior to exfiltration.
  • T1482 – Domain Trust Discovery
    Profiles compromised systems to identify domain trust relationships for lateral movement.
  • T1189 – Drive-by Compromise
    Distributed through compromised websites with fake update prompts, using drive-by-download techniques.
  • T1048.003 – Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
    Exfiltrates data via HTTP directly to the C2 domain to avoid encrypted channels.
  • T1105 – Ingress Tool Transfer
    Downloads additional malware to infected hosts to deepen compromise and persistence.
  • T1036.005 – Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
    Disguises itself as legitimate files like AutoUpdater.js to mimic real software updates.
  • T1027.013 – Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File
    Uses ZIP compression and Base-64 encoding to obfuscate JavaScript payloads and URLs.
  • T1566.002 – Phishing: Spearphishing Link
    Distributed via spear-phishing emails with links leading to compromised websites.
  • T1057 – Process Discovery
    Lists processes on targeted hosts to understand the environment.
  • T1518 – Software Discovery
    Identifies the victim’s browser to deliver the appropriate fake update page.
  • T1082 – System Information Discovery
    Collects system details, such as computer name, for context-specific targeting.
  • T1614 – System Location Discovery
    Uses IP-based geolocation to focus infections on North America, Europe, and parts of the Asia-Pacific region.
  • T1016 – System Network Configuration Discovery
    Enumerates domain name and Active Directory membership for potential privilege escalation.
  • T1033 – System Owner/User Discovery
    Uses whoami to obtain username information from compromised hosts.
  • T1204.001 – User Execution: Malicious Link
    Lures users into interacting with malicious links on compromised websites, triggering the malware.
  • T1102 – Web Service
    Uses Amazon Web Services to host second-stage servers, leveraging legitimate infrastructure.
  • T1047 – Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
    Employs WMI for script execution and system profiling to gather information stealthily.

V. Immediate Recommendations

  • Endpoint Detection and Response – Deploy EDR solutions to monitor and detect unusual behavior indicative of SocGholish activity, such as unexpected script execution or unauthorized C2 communications.
  • Restrict JavaScript Execution – Disable the execution of JavaScript on websites which are untrusted.
  • Regular Vulnerability Patching – Patch browsers, plugins, and other software regularly to reduce the risk of drive-by-download attacks.
  • Browser Hardening – Enforce browser settings to block pop-ups and auto-downloads from untrusted sources.
  • Anomalous Traffic Detection – Use network monitoring tools to detect and alert on unusual HTTP traffic patterns that may indicate SocGholish communication.
  • User Awareness Training – Regularly train employees on the risks of fake browser update prompts and how to identify phishing attempts.
  • Incident Response Plan (IRP) – Develop and test an incident response plan specifically addressing SocGholish-related threats, ensuring it includes steps for rapid isolation and containment.

VI. IOCs (Indicators of Compromise)

Type Indicator
IP

83[.]69[.]236[.]128

IP

88[.]119[.]169[.]108

IP

91[.]121[.]240[.]104

IP 185[.]158[.]251[.]240
IP 185[.]196[.]9[.]156
IP 193[.]233[.]140[.]136
IP 31.184.254[.]115
Domain aitcaid[.]com
Domain 0qsc137p[@]justdefinition.com 
Domain advancedsportsandspine[.]com
Domain automotivemuseumguide[.]com
Domain brow-ser-update[.]top
Domain circle[.]innovativecsportal[.]com
Domain  marvin-occentus[.]net
Domain photoshop-adobe[.]shop
Domain pluralism[.]themancav[.]com
Domain scada.paradizeconstruction[.]com
Domain storefixturesandsupplies[.]com
Domain 1sale[.]com
Domain taxes.rpacx[.]com
Domain *.signing.unitynotarypublic[.]com
Domain *.asset.tradingvein[.]xyz
Domain Column 2 Value 23
Domain change-land[.]com

VI. Additional OSINT Information

SocGholish operates as a JavaScript-based malware loader that initially infects victims through compromised websites, presenting them with fake browser or software update prompts. Once users click to “update,” the malware executes a JavaScript payload, connecting back to the attacker’s command and control (C2) server to deliver additional payloads.

Image 1 of SocGholish Payload Delivery

Image 2 of SocGholish Payload Delivery

Image 3 of SocGholish Payload Delivery via Fake Google Alerts

Payload details:

  • Primary Payload: The initial JavaScript script collects system and user information, which it sends back to the C2 server, enabling the attacker to assess the target for further exploitation. This reconnaissance phase helps the malware operators determine the value of the target and the appropriate secondary payloads to deploy.
  • Secondary Payloads: SocGholish is known to deploy additional malware based on the information gathered. Historically, it used the NetSupport RAT for remote access but has evolved to favor other tools. Since 2022, SocGholish shifted its preference to more advanced payloads, including:
  • Cobalt Strike: This well-known post-exploitation tool allows attackers to conduct further reconnaissance, privilege escalation, and lateral movement within networks. However, recent reports show a transition to using Mythic, an alternative to Cobalt Strike.
  • Mythic: A versatile open-source command and control framework used for post-compromise operations, allowing attackers to load additional modules and control infected systems stealthily.
  • Reconnaissance and Lateral Movement: The secondary payload often includes commands for system discovery and Active Directory enumeration. Common tools used in this phase include nltest.exe for domain trust discovery and whoami for privilege reconnaissance.
  • Ransomware Associations: SocGholish has acted as an initial access broker, facilitating access for ransomware groups such as LockBit and WastedLocker. This handoff process enables ransomware operators to capitalize on SocGholish’s infiltration to execute ransom demands or further network disruption.

By delivering these targeted payloads, SocGholish operators can gain persistent access, conduct extensive reconnaissance, and potentially disrupt critical systems. These payloads make SocGholish not only a potent malware threat but also a significant enabler of larger ransomware and espionage campaigns across various industries.

VII. References

The Center for Internet Security, Inc (October 23, 2024) Top 10 Malware Q3 2024 https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/blog/top-10-malware-q3-2024

Red Canary (2024) SocGholish https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/socgholish/

MITRE ATT&CK (March 22, 2024) SocGholish https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1124/

Blackpoint Cyber (June 21, 2024) AsyncRAT, NetSupport RAT, and VssAdmin Abuse for Shadow Copy Deletion https://blackpointcyber.com/resources/blog/asyncrat-netsupportrat-vssadmin-abuse-for-shadow-copy-deletion-soc-incidents-blackpoint-apg/

Proofpoint (November 22, 2022) Part 1: SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/part-1-socgholish-very-real-threat-very-fake-update

ReliaQuest (January 30, 2023) SocGholish: A Tale of FakeUpdates https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/socgholish-fakeupdates/

Threat Advisory created by The Cyber Florida Security Operations Center. Contributing Security Analysts: Yousef Blassy, Uday Bilakhiya, Thiago Pagliaroni, and Kayla Walker.

SocGholish Holds Top Spot as Leading Malware in Q3 20242024-11-25T10:41:29-05:00

chat:CYBR Podcast Episode 6: Jack Clabby

In this episode of chat:CYBR, attorney Jack Clabby discusses the evolving landscape of cybersecurity law and policy. Through this conversation, they dive into the challenges organizations face, the costs of cyber incidents, the need for a cohesive federal standard, and the importance of simplifying technology solutions for local governments.

chat:CYBR Podcast Episode 6: Jack Clabby2025-02-18T12:19:34-05:00

chat:CYBR Podcast Episode 6: Jack Clabby

In this episode of chat:CYBR, attorney Jack Clabby discusses the evolving landscape of cybersecurity law and policy. Through this conversation, they dive into the challenges organizations face, the costs of cyber incidents, the need for a cohesive federal standard, and the importance of simplifying technology solutions for local governments.

chat:CYBR Podcast Episode 6: Jack Clabby2025-02-18T12:19:55-05:00