Threat Advisories

I. Targeted Entities

• Opportunistic organizations

II. Introduction

Arechclient2 is a .NET remote access trojan (RAT) that has numerous capabilities. The RAT can profile victim systems, steal information like browser and crypto-wallet data, and launch a hidden secondary desktop to control browser sessions.

III. Cyber Florida SOC Observations

Update 12/8/2022:
Cyber Florida identified additional content in analysis that was not previously reported. This information pertains to network connections. Within utilizing the InstallUtil.exe binary to execute code, the InstallUtil.exe process was observed reaching out to a pastebin[.]com page. This page contained the CnC IP address. Additionally, the victim IP address (observed in the UIP parameter) appears to be ascertained from the InstallUtil.exe process from hxxp://eth0[.]me (which appears to be a site that identifies the visiting host’s IP address). 

Original Post:
Cyber Florida has observed network payload data obfuscated via Base64 encoding and sent to what appears to be a command control server. The command and control server appears to be utilizing Google cloud services (googleusercontent.com). Within the Base64 data, exfiltrated usernames and passwords were observed. Based on observations, the exfiltrated data appears to be from cached browser credentials (Google Chrome profiles, Firefox profiles, Microsoft Edge profiles, etc.) In reviewing logs and network traffic there were parameters of interest within the data payload that would aid in identifying this activity. The following payload parameters were observed the network traffic: ConnectionType, Client, SessionID, BotName, Computer, BuildID, BotOS, URLData, UIP.

Based on observing network traffic for the command control communication, there may be similarities associated to the Redline Stealer malware. See CERT Italy article. https://cert-agid.gov.it/news/scoperto-il-malware-redline-stealer-veicolato-come-lastpass/

Screenshot samples of log and network traffic have been provided in the appendix of this report.

Some of the interesting evasion tactics Cyber Florida observed were the utilization of “sleep” functions and the usage of .NET Framework’s InstallUtil.exe binary to communicate with the command and control server. The “sleep” functionality appeared to delay the usage of InstallUtil.exe. In testing, the Installutil.exe appeared to run in perpetuity regularly communicating with the command and control server. In reviewing a few of the automated sandboxes, the Installutil.exe activity was not identified. This may be due to the “sleep” activity being utilized.

Another evasion tactic appears to be attempting to modify Windows Defender settings via the second observed PowerShell instance. The cmdlet Set-MpPreference with the options –ExclusionPath ‘C:’ was employed. This command appears to create a malware scan exclusion, which would prevent Windows Defender from scanning the entire C: volume.

The following links provide examples and context of InstallUtil.exe malware usage and abuse.

https://gbhackers.com/hiding-malware-legitimate-tool/ (not directly related to observed activity)

https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/code-execution/t1118-installutil (not directly related to observed activity)

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004/

During initial malicious binary execution, a persistence mechanism was observed via the common HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun location.

IV. Additional Background Information

Blackpoint Cyber discovered an ISO file that contained a malicious Windows executable that was downloaded to a victim’s computer and was not detected by an antivirus program. A malicious executable, named Setup.exe, was observed using various defense evasion techniques including obfuscation, injection, and uncommon automation tools. These tools were used to drop a RAT named Arechclient2 (Blackpoint Cyber). The size of Setup.exe is over 300 megabytes (Blackpoint Cyber).

The initial attack vector that was used to send Setup.exe to the victim is unknown. This is the execution step. When Setup.iso is double-clicked, the ISO file can be mounted like a CD and, oftentimes, the contents of the file are automatically executed (Blackpoint Cyber). Running Setup.exe will start the extraction of three files and execute multiple child processes (Blackpoint Cyber). A new folder, IXP000.TMP, is made in the victim’s AppDataLocalTemp directory and three files are created into the newly created directory: Funding.mpeg, Mali.mpeg, and Dns.mpeg (Blackpoint Cyber).

The Dns.mpeg script is heavily obfuscated. The script searches for AvastUI.exe and AVGUI.exe running on the victim’s computer. The two executables are found in the Avast antivirus product line (Blackpoint Cyber). If those two executables are not found, Dns.mpeg sets Hole.exe.pif to the name AutoIT3.exe. In the script .au3 (or d.au3) there are over 3,000 references to a function named Xspci(). This function takes a string as its first argument and a number as its second argument. The function is responsible for decoding strings (Blackpoint Cyber).

The .au3 script accomplishes three things through injection: 1. establishing persistence using a URL file in the victim’s startup folder. 2. copying the ntdll.dll file from the C:WindowsSysWOW64 folder to avoid antivirus hooks. 3. injecting the embedded payload into jsc.exe (Blackpoint Cyber). The function that is responsible for the above tasks is KXsObHGILZNaOurxqSUainCYU() which takes a pointer to the binary to be injected, a string argument, and a string argument with the path to the binary that would be executed and injected into as arguments (Blackpoint Cyber). The script establishes persistence by adding a URL file to the victim’s startup folder that will execute a Microsoft Visual Basic Script (VBS) on every login (Blackpoint Cyber).

Arechclient2 has a decompilation phase. Test.exe, a C# binary, can be loaded into tools that statically and dynamically analyze code. One such tool is DnSpy (Blackpoint Cyber). The class names in Test.exe were minimized to single and double characters to add an additional layer of confusion for reverse engineers (Blackpoint Cyber). The actual name of Test.exe is 2qbarx12tqm.exe (Blackpoint Cyber). Arechclient2 also contains a command and control (C2) phase. When Arechclient2 is executed, it connects to https[:]//pastebin.com/raw/nJqnWX3u to collect C2 information (Blackpoint Cyber). The requested file, nJqnWX3u, contains the IP address 34[.]141[.]198[.]105 as a string. It also connects to http[:]//eth0.me to get its public IP address (Blackpoint Cyber). Arechclient2 connects to its C2 server on port 15647 to receive commands. The server responds with information to control the encryption status (“On” or “Off”) in JSON format (Blackpoint Cyber). If the communications are intercepted and the encryption is set to “Off,” further communications will be in plaintext (Blackpoint Cyber).

V. MITRE ATT&CK

• T1059.001 – Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
  Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code.
• T1555.003 – Credentials From Web Browsers
  Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
• T1547.001 – Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the “run keys” in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account’s associated permissions level.
• T1562.001 – Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
  Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware, tools, and activities. Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events.
• T1218.004 – System Binary Proxy Execution: InstallUtil
  Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. The InstallUtil binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:WindowsMicrosoft.NETFramework vInstallUtil.exe and C:WindowsMicrosoft.NETFramework64 vInstallUtil.exe.
• T1095 –Non-Application Layer Protocol
  Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.
• T1132.001 –Standard Encoding
  Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME.

VI. Recommendations

• Phishing awareness training
  Users should be informed and educated about new kinds of phishing scams currently being used and ones that have been used in the past. Awareness training should instruct users to avoid suspicious emails, links, websites, attachments, etc. Users should also be educated about new types of attacks and schemes to mitigate risk. Recommended link: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-014
• Set antivirus programs to conduct regular scans
  Ensure that antivirus and antimalware programs are scanning assets using up-to-date signatures
• Malware monitoring
  Continuously monitor current and new types of malware. Stay up to date on intel and advancements to prevent, defend, and mitigate these types of threats.
• Strong cyber hygiene
  Enforce a strong password policy across all networks and subsystems. Remind users to be wary of any messages asking for immediate attention, links, downloads, etc. All sources should be verified. Recommended link: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-131a
• Turn on endpoint protection
  Enable endpoint detection and response (EDR) to stop unknown malware in the product you’re using.
• Network Monitoring
  Review network logs, payload, etc. for related IP address and associated network parameters.

VII. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

VIII. Additional OSINT Information

• Embedded Binary
  https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9b2799e3fea7c214253ebba7a7cbb2b30ffe77dca6e92d8d7d25b539c4e9bd7c/details

• Main Binary
  https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b3eba1fcd0633a5ba27ba2715ad1e38943c2bf5e6e4182298a3bf39492f8eca4/details

• https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/724055/0/htmL
• https://cert-agid.gov.it/news/scoperto-il-malware-redline-stealer-veicolato-come-lastpass/

IX. Appendix

This screenshot shows the payload sent to a victim, as seen by Cyber Florida. A portion of the Base64 and UIP fields have been redacted.

 The following screenshot is similar from the log above but was acquired via network packet capture. 

X. References

Blackpoint Cyber. “Ratting out arechclient2 – Blackpoint Whitepaper.” Blackpoint Cyber. Accessed November 15, 2022. https://blackpointcyber.com/lp/ratting-out-arechclient2/?utm_campaign=ratting_out_arechclient2_whitepaper&utm_source=resource_library.  

Threat Advisory created by The Cyber Florida Security Operations Center. Contributing Security Analysts: Dorian Pope, Sreten Dedic, EJ Bulut, Uday Bilakhiya. 

I. Targeted Entities

• Colorado’s official website

II. Introduction

Colorado state officials say that on Wednesday, October 5, 2022, Colorado’s website was rendered unusable as the result of an apparent cyberattack after a known Russia-based hacker group made a Telegram post saying that it would be targeting U.S. state websites. While the U.S. election system is largely disconnected from the Internet, state websites are prime targets for hackers who want to undermine confidence in elections.

III. Background Information

The cyberattack flooded the state’s website with web traffic, and is a common and simple way to disable websites. There is no indication that any of Colorado’s internal systems were accessed or that its election systems were compromised.[1] However, given how close this attack is to the U.S. midterms, experts say that the attack could give the false impression that U.S. elections are vulnerable to foreign interference.[1]

Killnet, the group responsible for the attack, is a Russian-aligned group that claims to be made up of amateur hacktivists who support Russian’s international interests. Killnet adheres to the same model that Ukraine’s IT Army (the IT Army is a Ukrainian government-affiliated movement that frequently posts a list of Russian websites on Telegram for supporters around the globe to try to overwhelm with traffic). The tactic Killnet uses to overwhelm websites with traffic is known as a distributed denial of service, or DDoS.[1] On Wednesday, KillNet posted a list of 12 target states to its Telegram channel: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, and Mississippi.[1]

It is unclear if other states were affected, but federal officials have repeatedly stated that they do not expect a cyberattack to affect the midterm elections. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which oversees federal cybersecurity support for election infrastructure, released a joint announcement with the FBI saying, “any attempts by cyber actors to compromise election infrastructure are unlikely to result in large-scale disruptions or prevent voting.”[2]

Because DDoS attacks are simple to conduct and don’t inflict lasting damage or give criminals access to hidden information, cybersecurity professionals and other hackers generally regard them as unimpressive. However, Killnet has started becoming more effective at making websites unreachable, and has the potential to cause significant disruptions.[1]

IV. MITRE ATT&CK

• T1498 – Network Denial of Service
  Killnet performed a DDoS attack to degrade and block the availability of targeted websites. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on.

V. Recommendations

• Set antivirus programs to conduct regular scans
  Ensure that antivirus and antimalware programs are scanning assets using up-to-date signatures
• Monitor malware
  Continuously monitor current and new types of malware. Stay up to date on intel and advancements to prevent, defend, and mitigate these types of threats.
• Turn on endpoint protection
  Enable endpoint detection and response (EDR) to stop unknown malware in the product you’re using.

VI. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Because of the nature of this threat advisory, there are no IOCs. However, it is important that businesses and entities create a business continuity and disaster recovery plan in case a DDoS attack were to occur.

VII. References

(1) Collier, Kevin. “Cyberattack on Colorado State Website Follows Russian Hacktivist Threat.” NBCNews.com. NBCUniversal News Group, October 6, 2022. https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/colorado-state-websites-struggle-russian-hackers-vow-attack-rcna51012.

(2) “Malicious Cyber Activity Against Election Infrastructure Unlikely to Disrupt or Prevent Voting.” FBI & CISA Public Service Announcement, October 4, 2022. https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/PSA_cyber-activity_508.pdf.

Threat Advisory created by The Cyber Florida Security Operations Center. Contributing Security Analysts: Dorian Pope, Sreten Dedic, EJ Bulut, and Uday Bilakhiya.

I. Targeted Entities

• Edfinancial and Oklahoma Student Loan Authority loanees

II. Introduction

Oklahoma Student Loan Authority (OSLA) and EdFinancial are notifying over 2.5 million people that their personal data was leaked in a data breach that could lead to more trouble.

III. Background Information

Nelnet Servicing, a Lincoln, Nebraska-based servicing system and web portal provider for the two loan providers, was the target of the breach. Nelnet made the breach known to affected loan recipients on July 21^st via letter.[1]

By August 17^th, the investigation found that the personal user information, including the names, home addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, and social security numbers, of 2,501,324 student loan account holders had been accessed by an unauthorized party. However, the users’ financial information was not leaked.[2] In the breach disclosure filing submitted to the state of Maine by Bill Munn, Nelnet’s general counsel, the breach occurred between June 1, 2022 and July 22, 2022. But the letter sent to affected users pinpoints the breach to July 21, 2022.[3]

Although loanees’ sensitive financial data was not leaked, the personal information that was leaked “has [the] potential to be leveraged in future social engineering and phishing campaigns,” says Melissa Bischoping of Tanium. With the Biden administration’s recent announcement of a plan to cancel $10,000 of student loan debt for low- and middle-income loanees, it should be expected that this breach could be used by scammers for criminal activity. Bischoping warns that the recently leaked data can be used to impersonate affected brands in phishing campaigns that target students and recent college graduates.[4]

According to the breach disclosure, Nelnet informed Edfinancial and OSLA that Nelnet’s cybersecurity team “took immediate action to secure the information system, block the suspicious activity, fix the issue, and launched an investigation with third-party forensic experts to determine the nature and scope of the activity.” Also in the breach disclosure sent to the state of Maine is a statement that remediation will include two years of free credit monitoring, credit reports, and up to $1 million in identity theft insurance.[1]

IV. MITRE ATT&CK

• T1586 – Compromise Accounts
  Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting with information gained from the data breach.

V. Recommendations

• Phishing Awareness Training
  Users should be informed and educated about new kinds of phishing scams currently being used and ones that have been used in the past. Awareness training should instruct users to avoid suspicious emails, links, websites, attachments, etc. Users should also be educated about new types of attacks and schemes to mitigate risk. Recommended link: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-014
• Strong Cyber Hygiene
  Enforce a strong password policy across all networks and subsystems. Remind users to be wary of any messages asking for immediate attention, links, downloads, etc. All sources should be verified. Recommended link: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-131a

VI. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Because of the nature of the event, this threat advisory has no indicators of compromise. However, users should continue to remain vigilant.

VII. References

(1) Nelson, Nate. “Student Loan Breach Exposes 2.5M Records.” Threatpost English Global, August 31, 2022. https://threatpost.com/student-loan-breach-exposes-2-5m-records/180492/.

Threat Advisory created by The Cyber Florida Security Operations Center. Contributing Security Analysts: Dorian Pope, Sreten Dedic, EJ Bulut.

I. Targeted Entities

• Coinbase accounts

II. Introduction

Attackers are bypassing two-factor authentication (2FA) and using other evasion tactics in a campaign that is trying to take over Coinbase accounts to defraud users of their cryptocurrency.

III. Background Information

Researchers at PIXM Software say that the threat actors are using emails that spoof Coinbase to trick users into logging into their accounts so that the attackers can gain access to the accounts and steal funds.[2] The researchers say that the cybercriminals will distribute these stolen funds through a network of “burner” accounts, in an automated way, via hundreds or thousands of transactions. The cybercriminals do this in an effort to shroud the original wallet from their destination wallet.[2]

The attackers employ a range of tactics to avoid detection. One such tactic is what researchers call “short-lived domains.” These domains are only up for extremely short periods of time (less than two hours), which is a deviation from typical phishing practices.[1] Another tactic used is context awareness. Context awareness allows cybercriminals to know either the IP, CIDR Range, or geolocation from which they anticipate their target to be connecting. The attackers can then create something similar to an Access Control List (ACL) on the phishing page to restrict connections to only be allowed from the IP, CIDR Range, or region of their intended target.[1]

The Coinbase attacks begin with criminals targeting users with a malicious email that spoofs Coinbase so that victims think that they are receiving a legitimate message. The email uses a variety of reasons to persuade the user into logging into their account. For example, the account might be locked due to suspicious activity or a transaction needs to be confirmed. Like a typical phishing campaign, if the user is persuaded to follow the link in the phony message, they are taken to a fake login page and they are prompted to enter their credentials. If the user enters their credentials, the cybercriminal receives them in real-time and uses them to log in to the legitimate Coinbase website. Because the attacker logged into the legitimate Coinbase website, the victim is sent a 2FA code from Coinbase. Thinking that they are logging into the legitimate Coinbase website, the victim enters the 2FA code they received. However, like the login credentials, the cybercriminal receives the 2FA code and gains control of the victim’s account.[1]

Once the criminal has access to the account, they divert the victim’s funds to the aforementioned network of accounts in order to evade detection or suspicion. According to researchers, the funds are often embezzled through unregulated and illegal online cryptocurrency services, like cryptocurrency casinos, betting applications, and illegal online marketplaces.[1] At this point, the victim is told that their account is locked or restricted, and is prompted to talk to customer service to rectify their problem. This prompt is the second phase of the attack, where the cybercriminal poses as a Coinbase employee trying to help the victim regain access to their account, but in reality, is stalling so that the fund transfer can be completed before the victim becomes suspicious. Once the transfer is complete, the cybercriminal will abruptly close the session and then shut down the phishing page, leaving the victim without their funds.[1]

IV. MITRE ATT&CK

• T1566 – Phishing
  The threat actors will send phishing messages to gain access to a victim’s Coinbase account.

• T1111 – Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
  The threat actors target multi-factor authentication mechanisms to gain access to credentials that are used to access Coinbase systems and services.

V. Recommendations

• Phishing Awareness Training
  Users should be informed and educated about new kinds of phishing scams currently being used and ones that have been used in the past. Awareness training should instruct users to avoid suspicious emails, links, websites, attachments, etc. Users should also be educated about new types of attacks and schemes to mitigate risk. Recommended link: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-014
• Set Antivirus Programs to Conduct Regular Scans
  Ensure that antivirus and antimalware programs are scanning assets using up-to-date signatures.
• Strong Cyber Hygiene
  Enforce a strong password policy across all networks and subsystems. Remind users to be wary of any messages asking for immediate attention, links, downloads, etc. All sources should be verified. Recommended link: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-131a
• Turn on Endpoint Protection
  Enable endpoint detection and response (EDR) to stop unknown malware in the product you’re using.
• Malware Monitoring
  Continuously monitor current and new types of malware. Stay up to date on intel and advancements to prevent, defend, and mitigate these types of threats.

VI. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

This threat advisory has no indicators of compromise, but users should ensure that they are only interacting with legitimate communications from Coinbase and other services.

VII. References

(1) Montalbano, Elizabeth. “Phishers Swim Around 2FA in Coinbase Account Heists.” Threatpost English Global, August 8, 2022. https://threatpost.com/phishers-2fa-coinbase/180356/.

(2) PIXM Software, ed. “Coinbase Attacks Bypass 2FA.” Pixm Anti-Phishing, August 8, 2022. https://pixmsecurity.com/blog/phish/coinbase-attacks-bypass-2fa/.

Threat Advisory created by The Cyber Florida Security Operations Center. Contributing Security Analysts: Dorian Pope, Sreten Dedic, EJ Bulut.

I. Targeted Entities

• Google Chrome

II. Introduction

On July 4, Google quietly released a stable channel update for Google Chrome to patch an actively exploited zero-day vulnerability. This is the fourth flaw Google has released for Google Chrome this year.

III. Background Information

Chrome 103 (103.0.5060.71 for Android and 103.0.5060.114 for Windows and Mac) fixes a heap buffer overflow flaw in WebRTC. WebRTC is the engine that gives the browser its real-time communications capability.[1] The vulnerability, given the moniker CVE-2022-2294 and reported by Jan Vojtesek from the Avast Threat Intelligence team, is described as a buffer overflow, “where the buffer that can be overwritten is allocated in the heap portion of memory.”[1]

Google did not reveal any specific details about the vulnerability, but they did recommend that users upgrade their Google Chrome browsers. Because there are so few known details about the flaw, users’ most feasible protection is to upgrade their browser. Fortunately, Google Chrome updates are pushed without user intervention so most users will be protected once an update is available.[1]

Buffer overflows can lead to crashes and other attacks that make the affected program unavailable, like putting the program into an infinite loop. Attackers can take advantage of the attack by using the crash to execute arbitrary code usually outside of the scope of the program’s security policy.[1]

Along with fixing the zero-day buffer overflow flaw, the fix also patches a confusion flaw in the V8 JavaScript engine (CVE-2022-2295), which was reported on June 16^th by researchers at S.S.L.[1] This is the third flaw of this nature found in the open-source engine used by Google Chrome and Chromium-based web browsers that has been patched this year. In March, a different type-confusion issue in the V8 JavaScript engine (CVE-2022-1096) required a hasty patch from Google. And in April, Google patched another type-confusion flaw (CVE-2022-1364) which affected Google Chrome’s use of V8, which attackers had already pounced on.[1]

Another flaw patched the July 4 Google Chrome update is a use-after-free flaw in Chrome OS Shell, which was reported by Khalil Zhani on May 19^th and was given the moniker CVE-2022-2296, according to Google. Prior to patching the Chrome V8 JavaScript engine flaws in March and April, Google, in February, patched a zero-day use-after-free flaw in Chrome’s Animation component (CVE-2022-0609) that was under attack.[1]

IV. MITRE ATT&CK

Because the specific details of this flaw have not been announced, there are currently no MITRE ATT&CKs associated with this flaw.

V. Recommendations

• Phishing Awareness Training
  Users should be informed and educated about new kinds of phishing scams currently being used and ones that have been used in the past. Awareness training should instruct users to avoid suspicious emails, links, websites, attachments, etc. Users should also be educated about new types of attacks and schemes to mitigate risk. Recommended link: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-014
• Set Antivirus Programs to Conduct Regular Scans
  Ensure that antivirus and antimalware programs are scanning assets using up-to-date signatures.
• Strong Cyber Hygiene
  Enforce a strong password policy across all networks and subsystems. Remind users to be wary of any messages asking for immediate attention, links, downloads, etc. All sources should be verified. Recommended link: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-131a
• Turn on Endpoint Protection
  Enable endpoint detection and response (EDR) to stop unknown malware in the product you’re using.
• Malware Monitoring
  Continuously monitor current and new types of malware. Stay up to date on intel and advancements to prevent, defend, and mitigate these types of threats.

VI. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Because the specific details of this flaw have not been announced, there are currently no IOCs associated with this flaw.

VII. References

(1) Montalbano, Elizabeth. “Google Patches Actively Exploited Chrome Bug.” Threatpost English Global, July 5, 2022. https://threatpost.com/actively-exploited-chrome-bug/180118/.

Threat Advisory created by The Cyber Florida Security Operations Center. Contributing Security Analysts: Dorian Pope, Sreten Dedic, EJ Bulut, Tural Hagverdiyev, Uday Bilakhiya.

I. Targeted Entities

• Travel Industry

II. Introduction

As people begin to travel more post-COVID, researchers are warning that the travel industry is a prime target for an increase in cyber-related crimes. Criminal activity ranges from an uptick in adversaries targeting airline mileage reward points to website credentials for travel websites. The continued increase of these types of cybercrimes can have major impacts that may include flight delays and cancelations. The impact of these attacks is accounts that have been hacked and are stripped of their value.

III. Background Information

Since January, researchers at Intel 471 have found multiple hacks used by threat actors to trade the credentials linked to travel websites. The threat actors were specifically interested in “mileage rewards accounts with at least 100,000 miles.” These accounts are used to earn certain rewards on every dollar spent.[1] The credentials that were listed in February come from U.K. users from a major travel website and two U.S. airlines. The researchers at Intel 471 say, “access to these accounts allowed actors to leverage the rewards to book travel reservations for themselves and other customers. The accounts and their respective rewards points could be resold to other actors looking to conduct similar types of travel fraud activity.”[1]

The exploitation of rewards programs, especially those associated with travel, is not new. In 2018, two Russian teens were arrested for infiltrating more than a half-million online accounts, targeting services that offer reward points.[2] Researchers say that as the travel industry bounces back from its COVID-related slump, the industry once again becomes a target for criminals.[2]

Other nefarious activity includes the targeting of travel-related databases. These databases contain employee and traveler personal identifiable information (PII), which the criminals can sell for money. Intel 471 researchers noticed threat actors had exploited a travel-related database of 40,000 employees in Illinois. The researchers say that this leaked information plays a role in travel-related fraud, allowing a criminal to generate new identities that can be used to cross borders or evade authorities.[1]

Researchers at Intel 471 suggest that customers stay vigilant while making travel arrangements, should book flights from reliable sources, handle payment cautiously, and be on the lookout for any out-of-place offers.

IV. MITRE ATT&CK

• T1566 – Phishing
  Adversaries may utilize methods, like phishing, that involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
• T1555 – Credentials from Password Stores
  Adversaries may search common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.

V. Recommendations

• Phishing Awareness Training
  Users should be informed and educated about new kinds of phishing scams currently being used and ones that have been used in the past. Awareness training should instruct users to avoid suspicious emails, links, websites, attachments, etc. Users should also be educated about new types of attacks and schemes to mitigate risk. Recommended link: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-014
• Set Antivirus Programs to Conduct Regular Scans
  Ensure that antivirus and antimalware programs are scanning assets using up-to-date signatures.
• Strong Cyber Hygiene
  Enforce a strong password policy across all networks and subsystems. Remind users to be wary of any messages asking for immediate attention, links, downloads, etc. All sources should be verified. Recommended link: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-131a
• Turn on Endpoint Protection
  Enable endpoint detection and response (EDR) to stop unknown malware in the product you’re using.

VI. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

There are no IOCs for this threat advisory. However, users should remain vigilant of things that don’t seem right, and take the necessary precautions as they browse the Internet.

VII. References

(1) Intel 471, ed. “Cybercriminals Preying on Travel Surge with a Host of Different Scams.” Intel471, June 15, 2022. https://intel471.com/blog/travel-fraud-cybercrime-ransomware-pii.

(2) Tiwari, Sagar. “Travel-Related Cybercrime Takes Off as Industry Rebounds.” Threatpost English Global, June 15, 2022. https://threatpost.com/travel-related-cybercrime-takes-off/179962/.

Threat Advisory created by the Cyber Florida Security Operations Center. Contributing Security Analysts: Dorian Pope, Sreten Dedic, EJ Bulut, Tural Hagverdiyev, Uday Bilakhiya.

I. Targeted Entities

• Microsoft Office users

II. Introduction

Microsoft has recently established a workaround for a zero-day vulnerability, known as Follina, for Microsoft Office applications, such as Word, after being originally identified back in April. This vulnerability is a remote control execution (RCE) flaw, and if successfully exploited, threat actors have the ability to install programs, view, change, or delete data on targeted systems. The RCE is associated with the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) which, ironically, collects information about bugs in the company’s products and reports them to Microsoft Support.

III. Background Information

Microsoft explained that “a remote code execution vulnerability exists when MSDT is called using the URL protocol from a calling application such as Word…An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can run arbitrary code with the privileges of the calling application”.[1] The workaround comes about six weeks after the vulnerability was first seen by researchers from Shadow Chaser Group on April 12^th and reported to Microsoft on April 21^st. The vulnerability was noticed in a bachelor’s thesis from August 2020, with attackers seemingly targeting Russian users.[2] A Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence analyst also found the flaw back in April but could not fully identify it. The company posted a tweet on the same day, April 12^th.[2]

At first, when the flaw was first reported, Microsoft did not consider the flaw an issue. But now, it is clear that the vulnerability should be taken seriously, with Japanese security vendor Nao Sec tweeting a fresh warning, noting that the vulnerability was targeting users in Belarus. Security researcher Kevin Beaumont called the vulnerability Follina; the name comes from the zero-day code references to the Italy-based area code of Follina (0438).[2]

There is no fix for the flaw, but Microsoft recommends that affected users disable the MSDT URL to rectify the flaw for now. Disabling the MSDT URL, “prevents troubleshooters being launched as links including links throughout the operating system.”[2] To disable the MSDT URL, users should follow these steps:

1. Run Command Prompt as Administrator
2. Back up the registry key by executing the command “reg export HKEY_CLASSES_ROOTms-msdt filename”
3. Execute the command “reg delete HKEY_CLASSES_ROOTms-msdt /f” [2]

Microsoft says that the troubleshooters can still be accessed using the Get Help application and by using the system settings. Microsoft also says that if the calling application is an Office program, Office will open the document in Protected View and Application Guard for Office, which Microsoft says will “prevent the current attack.” However, Beaumont refuted that assurance in his analysis of the bug.[2] Microsoft also plans on updating CVE-2022-3019 with further information but did not specify when it would do so.[2]

Meanwhile, the unpatched flaw poses a significant threat. One reason is that the flaw affects a large number of people, given that it exists in all currently supported Windows versions and can be exploited via Office versions 2013-2019, Office 2021, Office 365, and Office ProPlus.[2] Another reason is that the flaw poses a major threat in its execution without action from the end-user. Once the HTML is loaded from the calling application, an MSDT scheme is used to execute a PowerShell code to run a malicious code payload.[2] Since the flaw is abusing the remote template feature in Microsoft Word, it is not dependent on a typical macro-based exploit path, which are common within Office-based attacks.[2]

Researchers say that this flaw is similar to last year’s zero-click MSHTML bug (CVE-2021-40444), which was pummeled by attackers, including the Ryuk ransomware gang. In fact, threat actors already pounced on this vulnerability. Proofpoint Threat Insight tweeted that threat actors were using the vulnerability to target organizations in Tibet by impersonating the “Women Empowerments Desk” of the Central Tibetan Administration. Moreover, the workaround Microsoft currently offers itself has issues and won’t provide much of a long-term fix. It is not friendly for admins because the workaround requires users to change their Windows Registry, says Aviv Grafti, CTO and founder of Votiro.[2]

IV. MITRE ATT&CK

• T1219 – Remote Access Software
  An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.
• T1218 – System Binary Proxy Execution
  Threat actors bypass signature-based defects by proxying the execution of malicious content with signed, or trusted binaries. This technique often involves Microsoft-signed files, which indicates that the binaries were either downloaded from Microsoft or already native to the operating system.
• T1221 – Template Injection
  Threat actors create or modify references in user document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts.
• T1566 – Phishing
  Adversaries may utilize methods like phishing that involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

V. Recommendations

• Phishing Awareness Training
  Users should be informed and educated about new kinds of phishing scams currently being used and ones that have been used in the past. Awareness training should instruct users to avoid suspicious emails, links, websites, attachments, etc. Users should also be educated about new types of attacks and schemes to mitigate risk. Recommended link: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-014
• Set Antivirus Programs to Conduct Regular Scans
  Ensure that antivirus and antimalware programs are scanning assets using up-to-date signatures.
• Disable Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool
  Microsoft recommends the affected users disable the MSDT URL to mitigate this vulnerability, as no patch yet exists for the flaw.
• Strong Cyber Hygiene
  Enforce a strong password policy across all networks and subsystems. Remind users to be wary of any messages asking for immediate attention, links, downloads, etc. All sources should be verified. Recommended link: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-131a
• Turn on Endpoint Protection
  Enable endpoint detection and response (EDR) to stop unknown malware in the product you’re using.

VI. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Because the HTTP GET request headers are out of order when compared to “typical” patterns, a custom-developed DDoS attack tool is assumed to be used, and it is possible that the values might change between campaigns. As such, Larry Cashdollar, a researcher at Akamai, says that writing signatures for these patterns may not benefit defenders from an IOC standpoint. More information can be found at the link below:

https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/revil-resurgence-or-copycat

VII. References

(1) Microsoft Security Response Center, ed. “Guidance for CVE-2022-30190 Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability.” Microsoft Security Response Center, May 30, 2022. https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/30/guidance-for-cve-2022-30190-microsoft-support-diagnostic-tool-vulnerability/.

(2) Montalbano, Elizabeth. “Microsoft Releases Workaround for ‘One-Click’ 0Day Under Active Attack.” Threatpost English Global, June 1, 2022. https://threatpost.com/microsoft-workaround-0day-attack/179776/.Threat Advisory created by the Cyber Florida Security Operations Center.

Contributing Security Analysts: Dorian Pope, Sreten Dedic, EJ Bulut, Uday Bilakhiya, Tural Hagverdiyev.

I. Targeted Entities

• Akami Technologies Incorporated and customers

II. Introduction

A recent denial of service (DDoS) campaign against a hospitality customer of Akamai, a cloud networking provider, and the defunct REvil ransomware gang claiming responsibility for it. It should be noted that researchers believe there is a high probability that the attack is not a resurgence of the infamous cybercriminal group but rather a copycat operation.

III. Background Information

Akamai researchers have been monitoring the DDoS attack since May 12^th, when a customer alerted the company’s Security Incident Response Team (SIRT) of an attempted attack by a group purporting to be REvil. The requests contain demands for payment, a bitcoin wallet, and business/political demands.[1] While the attackers claim to be REvil, it is not clear if the defunct group is responsible for the attacks, given that the attacks seem smaller than previous attacks that the group claimed responsibility for. The apparent political motivation behind the DDoS campaign is also inconsistent with REvil’s M.O.

REvil, which hasn’t been seen since July 2021, was a Russia-based ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group well-known for its attacks against Kaseya, JBS Foods, and Apple.[2] The disruptive nature of their attacks caused international authorities to take measures against the group, with Europol arresting a number of cybercriminals in November of 2021.[2] In March 2022, Russia, who up until then had done little to stop REvil’s operations, claimed responsibility for fully toppling the group at the behest of the U.S. government, arresting its individual members. One person arrested was instrumental in helping the ransomware group DarkSide, the group responsible for the Colonial Pipeline attack in May of 2021.[2]

The recent DDoS attack, which would be a shift in strategy for REvil, was comprised of a HTTP GET request in which the request path contained a message to the target containing a 554-byte message demanding payment. The victim was directed to send the bitcoin payment to a wallet address that “currently has no history and is not tied to any previously known bitcoin.”[2] The attack also has an additional geospecific demand that requested the targeted company to cease business operations across an entire country. The attackers threatened to launch follow-up attacks that would affect global business operations if the demand was not met and the ransom not paid in a specific amount of time.[2]

There is a precedent for REvil using DDos in its previous attacks, but it does not appear that this attack is the work of REvil. REvil’s M.O. was to gain access to a target network or organization and encrypt or steal sensitive data, demanding payment to decrypt or prevent information leakage to the highest bidders or threatening public disclosure of sensitive or damaging information. The technique in this attack is different from their normal strategy. The political motivation tied to the attack, which is linked to a legal ruling about the targeted company’s business model, also goes against REvil’s normal tactics, with leaders in the past saying that they were purely profit-driven.[2] However, it is possible that REvil is seeking a resurgence by trying out a new business model of DDoS extortion. However, what is more likely is cybercriminals using the name of a notorious cybercriminal group to frighten the targeted organization into meeting their demands.[2]

IV. MITRE ATT&CK

• T1498– Network Denial of Service
  This type of attack involves the adversary blocking the availability of targeted resources to users of a system. In this case, the adversary exhausted the network bandwidth that Akamai customers relied on and demanded payment to end this attack.

V. Recommendations

• Phishing Awareness Training
  Users should be informed and educated about new kinds of phishing scams currently being used and ones that have been used in the past. Awareness training should instruct users to avoid suspicious emails, links, websites, attachments, etc. Users should also be educated about new types of attacks and schemes to mitigate risk. Recommended link: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-014
• Set Antivirus Programs to Conduct Regular Scans
  Ensure that antivirus and antimalware programs are scanning assets using up-to-date signatures.
• Monitor Malware
  Continuously monitor current and new types of malware. Stay up to date on intel and advancements to prevent, defend, and mitigate these types of threats.
• Strong Cyber Hygiene
  Enforce a strong password policy across all networks and subsystems. Remind users to be wary of any messages asking for immediate attention, links, downloads, etc. All sources should be verified. Recommended link: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-131a
• Turn on Endpoint Protection
  Enable endpoint detection and response (EDR) to stop unknown malware in the product you’re using.

VI. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Because the HTTP GET request headers are out of order when compared to “typical” patterns, a custom-developed DDoS attack tool is assumed to be used, and it is possible that the values might change between campaigns. As such, Larry Cashdollar, a researcher at Akamai, says that writing signatures for these patterns may not benefit defenders from an IOC standpoint. More information can be found at the link below:

https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/revil-resurgence-or-copycat

VII. References

(1) Cashdollar, Larry. “REvil Resurgence? Or a Copycat?” Akamai Blog. Akamai Technologies, May 25, 2022. https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/revil-resurgence-or-copycat.

(2) Montalbano, Elizabeth. “Cybergang Claims Revil Is Back, Executes DDoS Attacks.” Threatpost English Global, May 26, 2022. https://threatpost.com/cybergang-claims-revil-is-back-executes-ddos-attacks/179734/.

Threat Advisory created by the Cyber Florida Security Operations Center.
Contributing Security Analysts: Dorian Pope, Sreten Dedic, EJ Bulut, Uday Bilakhiya, Tural Hagverdiyev.

I. Targeted Entities

• iPhone users

II. Introduction

New attacks have been discovered on iPhones that can be executed despite the device being turned off. This is a direct result of how Apple implements wireless features in iPhones such as Bluetooth, Near Field Communications (NFC), and Ultra-wideband (UWB) technologies. These features remain active on iPhones when powered down, which makes attack scenarios, such as loading malware on an iPhone’s Bluetooth chip to be executed while powered off, possible.

III. Background Information

The features previously mentioned have access to the iPhone’s Secure Element (SE) which stores sensitive information, even when the iPhone is shut off, according to a team of researchers from Germany’s Technical University of Darmstadt.[1] Because of this, malware is able to be loaded onto a Bluetooth chip that is executed while the iPhone is off (Germans). By attacking these wireless features, cybercriminals can access secure information, including a user’s credit card data, banking details, and even digital car keys on the iPhone.[2] Although this threat is ever-present, exploiting the threat is not so easy, with the threat actors still having to load the malware when the iPhone is on for later execution when the iPhone is off. This would require system-level access or remote code execution (RCE).[3]

The researchers at Germany’s Technical University of Darmstadt say that the cause of the issue is the low power mode (LPM) for wireless chips on iPhones. The LPM issue is caused when the user turns off their iPhone or when iOS shuts down automatically due to low battery. The researchers say that this is different than the power-saving feature that can be enabled by the user in the Settings app or

the Control Center. Because LMP is based on the iPhone’s hardware, and a solution cannot be patched via software, “wireless chips can no longer be trusted to be turned off after shutdown. This poses a new threat model.”[1]

Researchers analyzed the security of LPM features in a layered approach, observing the impact of the feature on application-, firmware-, and hardware-level security. A potential threat scenario that the researchers outlined on the iPhone’s firmware assumes that an attacker either has system-level access or can gain RCE using a known Bluetooth vulnerability.[2] In this attack, a threat actor with system-level access could modify firmware of any component that supports LPM. This way, they maintain limited control of the iPhone, even when the user turns the iPhone off.[3] Even if all firmware would be protected against manipulation, an attacker with system-level access could still send custom commands to chips that allow for “very fine-grained configuration, including advertisement rotation intervals and contents.” This could allow an attacker to create settings that would allow them to locate a user’s device with higher accuracy than the legitimate user in the Find My app, for example. [4]

The researchers reported their research to Apple, which did not provide feedback on the issues raised. A potential solution, according to the researchers, is for Apple to add “a hardware-based switch to disconnect the battery” so these wireless elements wouldn’t have power while an iPhone is powered down.[5]

IV. MITRE ATT&CK

• T1204 – User Execution
  Adversaries must have system-level access to iPhones to conduct this kind of attack. Thus, they may attempt to social engineer iPhone users to load malware into their devices to be later executed when powered off.

• T1569 – System Services
  Adversaries that have system-level control over iPhones will be able to execute malware remotely. Having this kind of control would give adversaries the ability to modify firmware that control low power mode, Bluetooth, NFC, and other wireless communication protocols.

• T1644 – Out of Band Data
  Adversaries are capable of executing previously loaded malware on iPhones that have been powered off. Out-of-band data streams, such as Bluetooth and NFC, allow adversaries to execute malware remotely without needing any power from the device’s battery.

V. Recommendations

• Set Antivirus Programs to Conduct Regular Scans
  Ensure that antivirus and antimalware programs are scanning assets using up-to-date signatures.
• Monitor Malware
  Continuously monitor current and new types of malware. Stay up to date on intel and advancements to prevent, defend, and mitigate these types of threats.
• Strong Cyber Hygiene
  Enforce a strong password policy across all networks and subsystems. Remind users to be wary of any messages asking for immediate attention, links, downloads, etc. All sources should be verified.
  Recommended link: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-131a
• Turn on Endpoint Protection
  Enable endpoint detection and response (EDR) to stop unknown malware in the product you’re using.

VI. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The link below has been included to assist with the download of some identified IOCs related to this Threat Advisory report. Be on the lookout for these IOCs, as well as anything that looks similar.

https://usf.box.com/s/inzlsmaxpkn72bo64sv5wya7ythbftid

VII. References

(1) Cleafy Labs. “TeaBot Is Now Spreading across the Globe.” Cleafy Labs. Cleafy Labs, January 3, 2022. https://www.cleafy.com/cleafy-labs/teabot-is-now-spreading-across-the-globe.

(2) Nelson, Nate. “Teabot Trojan Haunts Google Play Store, Again.” Threatpost English Global, March 2, 2022. https://threatpost.com/teabot-trojan-haunts-google-play-store/178738/.

Threat Advisory created by the Cyber Florida Security Operations Center.
Contributing Security Analysts: Dorian Pope, Ipsa Bhatt, Sreten Dedic, EJ Bulut, Uday Bilakhiya, Tural Hagverdiyev.