I. Targeted Entities
- Industries: Any (Opportunistic)
- Operating Systems: Windows, macOS, and Linux
II. Introduction
Written primarily in Golang, SparkRAT is a feature-rich, multi-platform Remote Administration Tool (RAT) that allows for the granular control of infected devices via web interface [11]. It was first published on GitHub in March of 2022 by elusive, Chinese-speaking developer XZB-1248. However, the project went largely unnoticed until gaining steady popularity in early 2023. Since then, the tool has been observed in numerous threat campaigns, including those carried out by cybercriminal groups Winnti and DragonSpark, as well as its involvement in the Hello Kitty and TellYouThePass ransomware attacks [6].
Like most Remote Access Toolkits, SparkRAT has been widely leveraged by threat actors for post-exploitation operations, typically being installed after the payload delivery and initial compromise. Most notably, the tool has been used in conjunction with several critical vulnerability exploits: CVE-2023-46604, CVE-2024-27198, and CVE-2024-43451 [1][3][4]. After a period of dormancy, SparkRAT resurfaced in January, with security researchers at Hunt.io detecting new C2 servers and hints of a possible DPRK campaign targeting macOS users [7].
III. SparkRAT Observed in DPRK Campaign
In a Twitter post by threat intelligence expert, Germán Fernández (@1ZRR4H) back in November 2024, a cyber espionage campaign attributed to the North Korean government was revealed, targeting macOS users and government organizations [5]. The threat actors behind this operation were reportedly distributing SparkRAT agents via fake online meeting platforms. Upon further investigation, researchers at Hunt.io and Cato Networks have recently identified additional C2 servers in South Korea and Singapore [2]. The findings suggest that this campaign is still active, although with a slight change in strategy and payload delivery method.
Interestingly, these uncovered C2 server domains were found to have open directories containing SparkRAT implants and bash scripts. Below are screenshots of an exposed directory and the content of its hosted scripts.
Screenshot of hxxps://gmcomamz[.]site/dev (Source: Hunt.io)
Curl results from hxxps://gmcomamz[.]site/dev/dev.sh
The bash script above downloads the Mach-O binary file (client.bin) from the hosting domain (updatetiker[.]site), saves it as “pull.bin” to the /Users/shared directory, changes its permissions to allow reading, writing, and execution by all system users, and runs the file as a background process. This is typical behavior of malware hosting servers.
The behavior of the test.sh script is similar, however, it points to another domain which has also been found to host SparkRAT agents (clients):
Curl results from hxxps://gmcomamz[.]site/dev/test.sh
IV. SparkRAT Analysis
Accessed through a browser, the SparkRAT Web UI provides an overview of active remote sessions along with system information of each connected machine. In addition to the basic operations listed below, the tool’s interface comes with several additional capabilities such as viewing a live instance of the victim’s screen, taking screenshots, and remote shutdown.
Generate Client creates an executable file that, when executed on a target machine, will create a backdoor connection with the associated C2 system. Clients can be customized to point to different hosts, connect over a specified port, and run on different operating systems (Windows, macOS/Darwin, and Linux).
As one would expect, the Terminal feature allows for attackers to execute commands on a target machine via a web-based PowerShell GUI. If used in combination with remote privilege escalation, attackers can carry out system-level operations like disabling the firewall, modifying registry keys, and disabling antivirus software.
The Process feature lists all running processes as well as the ability to stop them. This can be used to terminate security/monitoring software.
Explorer allows attackers to enumerate, create, and delete files/directories on the target system. It also allows files/directories to be downloaded to the attacker’s local machine or uploaded to the target machine.
Wireshark capture showing initial client-C2 communication
In this exchange, captured shortly after the execution of a SparkRAT agent, the target system sends a request to upgrade its connection to use the WebSocket protocol. A WebSocket handshake over port 8000 is a key characteristic of SparkRAT command-and-control (C2) traffic.
Client POST Request to update SparkRAT version
Following the WebSocket handshake, the target system sends a POST request with the commit query parameter storing the current version of the tool. This enables the RAT to automatically upgrade itself to the latest version available on the C2 server [10]. It is also worth noting the unusual User-Agent string as well as the JSON return value indicating that this client is using the latest SparkRAT version that the server can offer.
V. MITRE ATT&CK
- T1059 – Command and Scripting Interpreter
Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms.
- T1571 – Non-Standard Port
Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated.
- T1005 – Data from Local System
Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems and configuration files or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
- T1071.001 – Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (C2)
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Protocols such as HTTP/S and WebSocket that carry web traffic may be very common in environments.
- T1105 – Ingress Tool Transfer (C2)
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment.
- T1573.001 – Symmetric Cryptography (C2)
Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol.
- T1082 – System Information Discovery
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.
- T1083 – File and Directory Discovery
Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system.
- T1106 – Native API
Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors.
VI. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
As is the case with most open-source malware toolkits, the list of IOCs associated with SparkRAT activity is extensive. Currently, the project’s GitHub repository has over 500 forks and 16,000 latest-release downloads, indicating that the tool is likely adapted for use in the development of custom malware (all of which would have their own IOCs). Below are the most recent and most frequently observed SparkRAT IOCs.
| Type |
Indicator |
| SHA-256 Hashes |
fcf9b70253437c56bb00315da859ce8e40d6410ec405c1473b374359d5277209
3bfb4f5c328d57b647ba81045eae223ff292f0caa216fee97e98127b2934c6b0
cd313c9b706c2ba9f50d338305c456ad3392572efe387a83093b09d2cb6f1b56
9c4d6d66dcef74f4a6ce82369830a4df914becd7eb543bdcc5d339b7b3db254b
cd313c9b706c2ba9f50d338305c456ad3392572efe387a83093b09d2cb6f1b56
52277d43d2f5e8fa8c856e1c098a1ff260a956f0598e16c8fb1b38e3a9374d15
ffe4cfde23a1ef557f7dc56f53b3713d8faa9e47ae6562b61ffa1887e5d2d56e
065d2b17ad499587dc9de7ee9ecda4938b45da1df388bc72e6627dff220f64d2
f015f91722c57cdb7ee61d947fb83f395d342e3d36159f7a470e23b6c03681bf
5802d266c6fd8f45323b7d86d670059f1bd98de42a173fbc2ac66399b9783713 |
| Associated Filenames |
msoia.exe
client.bin
client.exe
3261cbac9f0ad69dd805bfd875eb0161.exe
one68_1_1.0.apk |
| IPs |
67.217.62[.]106
152.32.138[.]108
15.235.130[.]160
118.194.249[.]38
51.79.218[.]159
37.230.62[.]73 |
| Domains |
gsoonmann[.]site
gmnormails[.]site
gmoonsom[.]site
nasanecesoi[.]site
gmoocsoom[.]site
gmcomamz[.]site
namerowem[.]site
gmoosomnoem[.]site
mncomgom[.]site
ggnmcomas[.]site
updatetiker[.]net
updatetiker[.]site
gomncomow[.]site
gooczmmnc[.]site
gnmoommle[.]space
one68[.]top
remote[.]henh247[.]net
remote[.]henho247[.]net |
VII. Recommendations
Exercise Good Cyber Hygiene – The easiest, most effective way to prevent system compromise via Remote Access Trojans like SparkRAT is to simply practice good cyber hygiene. This includes not opening unknown files, being suspicious of email attachments from untrusted sources, avoiding downloading software from unofficial websites, and regularly updating operating systems.
Isolated Virus Scans – Performing a malware detection scan (via crowdsourced tools like VirusTotal or antivirus software like Microsoft Defender’s custom scan option) on an untrusted file before executing it can be an easy way to verify its legitimacy. Fortunately, most AV solutions are privy to common SparkRAT indicators and will prevent infected files from executing. However, custom malware leveraging the tool may go undetected. If further analysis is required, it is advised to run any suspected file within a sandbox environment to examine its behavior.
Update Virus Signatures – Ensuring that endpoint solutions and antivirus software are up to date with the latest virus signatures is crucial for detecting and quarantining known variations of SparkRAT malware. Signature databases used by AV software are typically populated with new signatures when applying the latest security patches. For this reason, it is recommended to frequently update (daily) or configure automatic system/application updates.
Active Network Monitoring – A system infected with SparkRAT malware establishes a connection to its C2 server via WebSocket, a web-based application protocol that enables full-duplex communication between client and server [8]. Though sometimes used by legitimate software, such as instant messengers and multiplayer games, the use of this protocol over port 8000 (the default port for SparkRAT agents) could be a strong indicator of SparkRAT activity. To detect this traffic, network monitoring and deep packet inspection tools can be deployed to look for abnormal connections over port 8000, WebSocket handshakes by unknown applications, and JSON error messages indicative of SparkRAT C2.
Stay Informed – As SparkRAT gains traction, it is likely to be featured in future malware campaigns. Thankfully, threat hunters and intelligence agencies are vigilantly discovering and sharing IOCs linked to the tool. Engaging with threat intel networks and staying aware of new SparkRAT trends will allow for better preparation of systems and aid in detection efforts of emerging threats.
VIII. References
[1] Arctic Wolf. (November 3, 2023). Exploitation of CVE-2023-46604 in Apache ActiveMQ Leads to TellYouThePass Ransomware. https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/tellmethetruth-exploitation-of-cve-2023-46604-leading-to-ransomware/
[2] Bittner, D. (Jan 29, 2025). Cats and RATS are all the rage. https://thecyberwire.com/podcasts/daily-podcast/2234/transcript
[3] Broadcom (January 31, 2025). SparkRAT – a cross-platform modular malware. https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/sparkrat-a-cross-platform-modular-malware
[4] ClearSky (November 13, 2024). CVE-2024-43451: A New Zero-Day Vulnerability Exploited in the wild. https://www.clearskysec.com/0d-vulnerability-exploited-in-the_wild/
[5] Fernández, G. (Nov 27, 2024). SparkRAT: Server Detection, macOS Activity, and Malicious Connections. https://x.com/1ZRR4H/status/1861667506328334589/
[6] Fortinet. (February 13, 2024). Threat Coverage: How FortiEDR protects against SparkRAT activity. https://community.fortinet.com/t5/FortiEDR/Threat-Coverage-How-FortiEDR-protects-against-SparkRAT-activity/ta-p/299271
[7] Hunt.io. (Jan 28, 2025). SparkRAT: Server Detection, macOS Activity, and Malicious Connections. https://hunt.io/blog/sparkrat-server-detection-macos-activity-and-malicious-connections
[8] IETF. (Dec 2011). The WebSocket Protocol. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6455
[9] Mishra, A. (Jan 29, 2025). Hackers Attacking Windows, macOS, and Linux systems With SparkRAT. https://gbhackers.com/hackers-attacking-windows-macos-and-linux-systems/
[10] SentinelLabs. (Jan 24, 2023) DragonSpark | Attacks Evade Detection with SparkRAT and Golang Source Code Interpretation. https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/dragonspark-attacks-evade-detection-with-sparkrat-and-golang-source-code-interpretation/
[11] XZB-1248. (Mar 16, 2022). SparkRAT GitHub Repository. https://github.com/XZB-1248/Spark
Additional Resources
[12] Open Threat Exchange. “SparkRAT”. https://otx.alienvault.com/browse/global/pulses?q=SparkRAT&include_inactive=0&sort=-modified&page=1&limit=10&indicatorsSearch=SparkRAT
[13] Malpedia. “SparkRAT”. https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.spark_rat
[14] ThreatFox. SparkRAT IOCs. https://threatfox.abuse.ch/browse/malware/win.spark_rat/
[15] Hybrid Analysis. client.bin Sandbox Report. https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/cd313c9b706c2ba9f50d338305c456ad3392572efe387a83093b09d2cb6f1b56
[16] VirusTotal. client.bin Scan. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cd313c9b706c2ba9f50d338305c456ad3392572efe387a83093b09d2cb6f1b56
Threat Advisory created by The Cyber Florida Security Operations Center.
Contributing Security Analyst(s): Isaac Ward
